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ABSTRACT
Fletcher v the Government of Manitoba is the first reported challenge to a floorcrossing prohibition under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This
case comment begins with the legislative history of the challenged provision
and then provides an overview and critique of the reasons in Fletcher.
Against this backdrop, it then reflects on the lessons of the case in two
respects. The first is the difficulty in translating a policy idea into legislation
– specifically, defining the conduct to be prohibited and determining the
appropriate deterrent or penalty for breach. The second respect is the
government’s role in defending legislation in court, particularly legislation
that it considers to be bad policy and plans to repeal. The comment
concludes that Fletcher ultimately demonstrates that governments should
defend constitutionally viable laws in court – even laws that were adopted
by a previous government and that are destined for repeal as bad policy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most controversial things a legislator can do is cross the
floor, i.e. join the caucus of a party other than that under which he or she
was elected.1 Fletcher v the Government of Manitoba2 is the first reported
challenge to such a prohibition under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.3 Fletcher presents an excellent opportunity to reflect on larger
themes in lawmaking and the government’s legal defence of legislation.
Steven Fletcher, the member of the Legislative Assembly of Manitoba for
the riding of Assiniboia, was expelled from the governing Conservative
caucus.4 He was then bound by a floor-crossing prohibition in the Legislative
Assembly Act that prevented him from joining another party’s caucus.5 He
applied for a declaration that the prohibition breached the Charter,
specifically sections 2(b) (expression), 2(d) (assembly), and 3 (democratic
rights). While the application was unsuccessful, the government
simultaneously passed a bill repealing the prohibition.6 The bill received
Royal Assent fifteen days before Fletcher’s application was denied.7
This comment analyzes the reasons in Fletcher and their larger
implications, and is organized in four parts. In Part I, I establish the context
for my commentary: the language and legislative history of the prohibition
and the legislative history of its repeal. In Part II, I canvas and critique the
Court’s decision in Fletcher. In Part III, I consider the lessons for lawmaking,
and in Part IV I consider the implications for the government’s legal defence
1

For a recent and fairly standard account of floor-crossing, see e.g. “Leona Alleslev and
the unseemly politics of crossing the floor”, The Globe and Mail (19 September 2018)
online: <theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/article-globe-editorial-leona-alleslevand-the-unseemly-politics-of-crossing/> [perma.cc/NKW9-B5RS] [Globe editorial].

2

Fletcher v the Government of Manitoba, 2018 MBQB 104 [Fletcher].

3

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss 2(b), 3, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].

4

Fletcher, supra note 2 at paras 1-2.

5

Ibid at para 3; The Legislative Assembly Act, CCSM c L110, s 52.3.1.

6

The Legislative Assembly Amendment Act (Member Changing Parties), SM 2018, c 3;
Manitoba, Bill 4, 34th Leg, 3rd Sess (2018) [Member Changing Parties Act].

7

Manitoba, Legislative Assembly, Debates and Proceedings, 41-3, vol LXXI No 58 (4
June 2018) at 2846 [Hansard (4 June 2018)].
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of legislation. I then conclude by reflecting on these lessons and their
implications.

II. PART I – CONTEXT: THE PROHIBITION’S ADOPTION AND
REPEAL

Prior to its repeal, section 52.3.1 of The Legislative Assembly Act read as
follows:
A member who:
a) is elected with the endorsement of a political party; and
b) ceases to belong to the caucus of that party during the term for which
he or she was elected;
must sit in the Assembly as an independent and is to be treated as such for the
purposes of this Act and all proceedings in the Assembly during the remainder
of the member's term.8

Other than fixing a minor typographical error,9 the section was never
amended.
When section 52.3.1 was adopted in 2006, then-Premier Gary Doer of
the NDP framed the issue as one of voter trust: “We believe the voters trust,
if you run as a Tory, even if you do not agree with their policies, you have
to stay with the Tories or be an independent. You cannot cross the floor to
another political party.”10 The Liberal party argued that recall legislation
would be a more comprehensive and direct way to ensure voter trust than
an outright ban on floor-crossing, allowing voters to judge legislators and
their reasons for doing so.11 The Conservative party argued instead for a
prohibition on “inducements,” such as cabinet membership, to cross the

8

The Legislative Assembly Act, supra note 5, s 52.3.1, as added by The Elections Reform Act,
SM 2006, c 15, Sched E, s 1.

9

The Statutes Correction and Minor Amendments Act, 2010, SM 2010, c 33, s 31(4):
“Clause 52.3.1(b) of the English version is amended by striking out "her" and
substituting "he".”

10

Manitoba, Legislative Assembly, Debates and Proceedings, 38-4, vol LVII No 66 (10 May
2006) [Hansard (10 May 2006)] at 1985 (Hon Gary Doer). For my purposes, Doer’s
expressed belief is more important than its accuracy. See below note 52 and
accompanying text.

11

Ibid at 1992 (Hon Jon Gerrard); Ibid at 1987 (Kevin Lamoreux).
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floor.12 Opposition members further noted that some legislators cross the
floor for principled reasons by stating: “If somebody wants to cross the floor
on a matter of principle, that is important. We think they should have the
right to do that.”13 As well, they noted that Winston Churchill did so
twice.14
In the shadow of Fletcher’s court application, the Conservative
government introduced a bill to repeal the prohibition. The Minister of
Justice gave two main reasons for the repeal. One was that the prohibition
was “unparliamentary” and “goes against…the Westminster parliamentary
traditions that we uphold in our country.”15 The second reason was to avoid
spending money defending against Fletcher’s application in court – “saving
taxpayers thousands in potential legal expenses defending the floor-crossing
ban.”16 The Minister also made two revealing comments that I will return
to below – that the prohibition was “an… unworkable policy” and that it
“should never have been introduced in the first place.”17 While the Minister
refused to state whether or not the prohibition was constitutional, Fletcher
referred to previous government statements that it was unconstitutional,
and suggested a faster way to avoid the costs of defending against his
application would be to concede it.18 In contrast, NDP legislator and former
Minister of Justice Andrew Swan suggested that the government had
received advice that the prohibition was arguably constitutional, and that

12

Manitoba, Legislative Assembly, Debates and Proceedings, 38-4, vol LVII No 79B (30
May 2006) at 2787 (Hugh McFadyen).

13

Ibid.

14

Hansard (10 May 2006) supra note 10 at 1992 (Hon Jon Gerrard).

15

Manitoba, Legislative Assembly, Debates and Proceedings, 41-3, vol LXXI No 8B (30
November 2017) at 263, 264 (Hon Heather Stefanson) [Hansard (30 November
2017)].

16

Ibid at 263. See also 264, 265.

17

Ibid at 263.

18

Ibid at 266 (Steven Fletcher). See also 264, 265. Fletcher at 264 also quite reasonably
suggested, in the alternative to conceding the application, that the Minister of Justice
seek unanimous consent to fast-track the bill.
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was why the government could not concede the application.19 He also
argued that the prohibition remained necessary for voter trust.20
In this comment, I use the term “bad policy” to reflect the government’s
public position that the floor-crossing prohibition was unparliamentary and
unworkable and never should have been adopted. I emphasize that “bad
policy” is about laws that pose problems other than unconstitutionality.21

III. PART II – THE COURT’S DECISION AND MY CRITIQUE
In this Part, I canvass the arguments made by the parties and the reasons
given by the Court for denying the application. I then offer a critique of
those reasons.

A. The Positions of the Parties
Fletcher argued that the prohibition infringed his Charter rights and
“has the practical effect of limiting [his] ability to represent his
constituents.”22 According to his argument, his freedom of association
under section 2(d) was infringed because the prohibition prevented him
from associating with a recognized political party, which would provide him
advantages in the legislature that were not available to independent
members,23 thus “preventing [him] from fully exercising [his] freedom of
19

Ibid at 278 (Andrew Swan): “He’s [Fletcher’s] asked a number of times, well, why don’t
they just throw in the towel? Well, the reason they can’t throw in the towel is because
they’ve got advice, I know, from their own department saying, well, actually, we think
there is a very arguable case that this legislation continues to be constitutional. That’s
the problem that this minister has.”

20

Ibid at 274.

21

Indeed, this is consistent with the language of the application judge. See Fletcher, supra
note 2 at paras 47, 60, 82 (“bad public policy”).

22

Fletcher, supra note 2 at para 13.

23

Ibid at para 26: “a) the ability to caucus; b) the right to have a House Leader to
participate in procedural discussions with the House leader of the Government and
the Official Opposition; c) the right to participate in the Legislative Assembly by
asking questions to the full extent contemplated by the Rules; d) the right to sit and
vote on Committees of the Legislative Assembly; e) the right to an allocation of
resources of the Legislative Assembly; f) the right to fund raise and to issue tax receipts
to donors; g) the right to one of the opposition days established by the Rules of the
Legislative Assembly; h) the right to select up to three private members' bills as a
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association by pursuing [his] goals/objectives as an MLA.”24 His freedom of
expression under section 2(b) was infringed because the prohibition
prevented him “from joining any other political party to caucus,”25 and
because of the same limitations on his activities as an independent MLA as
noted above.26 Fletcher also argued that section 3 was infringed because
“[b]y denying his right to join another political party, [his] constituents have
lost the ability to understand their member’s views on the issues of the
day.”27 Fletcher further argued that none of these infringements were
justifiable under section 1 of the Charter because the objective of
“preventing members from changing political parties during the course of
the term in which they were elected cannot be considered pressing and
substantial,”28 the impairment was not minimal, and the harms exceeded
the benefits.29
In response, the government argued that the prohibition was protected
from judicial review as “part of the inherent parliamentary privilege to
control its internal proceedings,”30 and in any event did not violate the
Charter:
[N]otwithstanding s. 52.3.1, the applicant is free to associate with whomever he
pleases. He is not restricted from joining or caucusing with any political party he
chooses. There are no limitations on the topics where he can offer an opinion. He
can campaign and raise money for himself or any political party. As with all MLAs,
he is bound by the internal procedural rules and practices of the legislature, which

member of an opposition caucus to come to a second reading vote each session.” See
also Cameron Siles, “Modest Steps Toward Reform: A Review of Post-Emerson
Initiatives to Curtail Floor Crossing” (2012) 30:2 NJCL 171 at 179: “If an MLA
wishes to sit as an independent, they can do so without triggering a by-election, but at
the cost of doing without the rights and privileges (primarily additional staff and
research resources) that come with being a member of a recognized party caucus.”
24

Fletcher, supra note 2 at para 27.

25

Ibid at para 31.

26

Ibid at paras 32-33.

27

Ibid at para 38.

28

Ibid at para 40.

29

Ibid at paras 39-44.

30

Ibid at para 48.
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are part of the Assembly's inherent parliamentary privilege to control its internal
proceedings, and does not violate his Charter rights in the ways suggested.31

At the same time, the government “conceded that s. 52.3.1 of the Act runs
counter to the parliamentary tradition in Canada.”32

B. The Reasons
Justice Lanchbery held that the prohibition was protected by
parliamentary privilege and that it did not infringe sections 2(b), 2(d), or 3
of the Charter.33 Section 3 was not infringed because the prohibition “has
no effect on the right to vote, or to be an MLA.”34 The alleged infringement
of expression was not supported by the evidence, as Fletcher “remains able
to attempt to persuade others … to come to his point of view whether inside
or outside the legislature.... his speech has not been subject to any
restrictions as he has claimed.”35 Indeed, as an independent member
Fletcher actually had greater ability to express himself.36 Neither was his
freedom of association infringed:
The applicant is incorrect that he is prohibited from joining any political party that
permits him to be a member. Section 52.3.1 does not limit this ability in any way.
The applicant can caucus with any political party or group of members of the
legislature that permits him to caucus. Caucusing is the ability to join discussions
with others with their permission. It does not mean that you have to be a member
of that party. I take judicial notice that in fact independent members in the
legislature and in the House of Commons are able to caucus with members of a
different political party without restrictions placed upon that activity by the

31

Ibid at para 49.

32

Ibid at para 47.

33

Ibid at paras 82 (privilege), 69 (Charter).

34

Ibid at para 68. I note here Siles’ argument that the floor-crossing prohibition
promotes the section 3 rights of voters, because floor-crossing “cast[s] doubt about
whether their choice was a fully informed one based on accurate and complete
information provided to them by candidates”: Siles, supra note 23 at 182-183. See also
Karen Eltis, “Proportionally Reconciling Floor-Crossing With Conflicting Charter
Rights: A Proposal for Regulating the Practice” (2008) 22:2 NJCL 215 esp at 219-223,
230-233. Eltis also argues that floor-crossing is contrary to voters’ freedom of
expression in choosing the party for which to vote at 221, 233-235.

35

Fletcher, supra note 2 at para 74.

36

Ibid at paras 71-79.
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legislature or Parliament. The only restrictions on his ability to do so is having
other members agreeing to caucus with him.37

Furthermore, parliamentary privilege applied because “[t]here is nothing to
suggest that s. 52.3.1 does anything but provide for the dignity, integrity and
efficient functioning of the legislature.”38
In reaching his decision, Lanchbery J also made important observations
about the role of the court in these circumstances. First, the government’s
repeal of the prohibition did not affect the question of its legality or the
court’s responsibility to decide the matter before it:
In a Charter argument that involves a question of parliamentary privilege, it must
be remembered that if one political party is of the view that the legislation is bad
public policy, it does not and should not end the matter. Revocation does not
mean that a different political party or even a future government of the same
political stripe may seek to reintroduce similar legislation. 39

Second, the fact that a provision “may be bad public policy” is not an
appropriate reason for courts to interfere, especially as the provision relates
to the legislature.40
While not essential to his decision, Lanchbery J also made some
important comments about floor-crossing generally. Near the beginning of
his reasons, Lanchbery J discussed what floor-crossing means and why it is
considered to be objectionable:
The record is clear that the legislation was designed to prevent "floor crossing".
Floor crossing is commonly understood to mean when a member leaves the
benches of the political party to whom he/she was elected to serve, and seeks to
join the ranks of another political party, without facing the electorate. The most
publicized instances, and therefore the most recognizable by members of the
general public, are those where the member is … offered an inducement such as a
seat in the Cabinet of the governing party.
Public sentiment about floor crossing has generally been negative …. The theory
behind the ban against floor crossing and joining another political party is that if
37

Ibid at para 76.

38

Ibid at para 80. I note here Siles’ argument that floor-crossing is political and so not
justiciable: Siles, supra note 23 at 185. However, I would argue that parliamentary
privilege (which Siles also considers at 185-186, without naming it explicitly) is a
better and more Canadian fit than political non-justiciability.

39

Fletcher, supra note 2 at para 60.

40

Ibid at para 82.
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a member wishes to leave his/her political party, it is the voter that should decide
the fate of such a member before he/she is allowed to cross the floor, and not the
unilateral wishes of the member, or another political party.41

Justice Lanchbery also noted that Fletcher’s circumstances were different
than the typical floor-crossing scenario but the prohibition as written did
not recognize that difference:
In this case, the applicant did not cross the floor, but was expelled from the
Progressive Conservative caucus. This is a distinction without a difference for the
purpose of the Act. The applicant must face the voters if he wants to be recognized
as a member of another party in the legislature. 42

Later in his reasons, Lanchbery J returned to this point, again distinguishing
Fletcher’s circumstances from what he termed “traditional floor crossing”:
It is clear that the applicant follows his own conscience. He has always displayed a
sense of independence, which is at times at odds with party discipline. Should such
a member be penalized by s. 52.3.1 when his actions were not the traditional "floor
crossing"? Section 52.3.1 is a blanket provision that does not distinguish between
the different types of floor crossing.43

These observations raise important questions about the appropriate scope
and design of a prohibition on floor-crossing.

C. Critique of the Reasons
There are two respects in which the reasons are curious: mootness, and
the scope and meaning of freedom of association. There is also an
overlooked question about the constitutional nature and role of
parliamentary tradition and the part it ought to play in circumstances such
as these.
The first and most obvious curiosity in the reasons is that there is no
explicit discussion of mootness. As mentioned above, the decision came
down fifteen days after the repeal received royal assent.44 While there were
nonetheless good reasons to continue – in particular, judicial economy and,
as Lanchbery J noted, the possibility that the prohibition could be re41

Ibid at paras 5-6 [emphasis in original]. As for the generalization that “[p]ublic
sentiment about floor crossing has generally been negative”, see below note 52 and
accompanying text.

42

Fletcher, supra note 2 at para 7.

43

Ibid at para 63.

44

Hansard (4 June 2018), supra note 7.
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enacted in future – it seems surprising that the issue was not addressed
explicitly.
The second curiosity in the reasons is that the reasons given set out a
fairly narrow or thin conception of freedom of association. Recall that
Lanchbery J adopted a thin conception of caucusing:
The applicant can caucus with any political party or group of members of the
legislature that permits him to caucus. Caucusing is the ability to join discussions
with others with their permission. It does not mean that you have to be a member
of that party.45

Under this conception, Fletcher’s freedom of association is purportedly
maintained because he is able to associate with other members, even though
he is not able to be recognized and to identify himself to others as a member
of a party’s caucus. This seems to be a surprisingly minimalist conception of
freedom of political association. Indeed, one can reasonably presume that
caucusing with legislators of a different party is rare in modern Canadian
politics, given the dominance and centrality of political parties and the
consequences of perceived disloyalty.46 Moreover, it is the formal party and
caucus membership, not mere caucusing itself in the sense invoked by
Lanchbery J, that is meaningful and provides advantages.
The reasons in Fletcher also leave a key question about parliamentary
privilege unanswered. The recognition of parliamentary privilege in the
written constitution comes from the preamble to the Constitution Act,
1867.47 However, the preamble arguably recognizes and incorporates
45

Fletcher, supra note 2 at para 76. See above note 34 and accompanying text.

46

See e.g. Semara Sevi, Antoine Yoshinaka & Andrew Blais, “Legislative Party Switching
and the Changing Nature of the Canadian Party System, 1867-2015” (2018) 51:3 Can
J Political Science 665 at 665: “Organized less around connecting citizens to
government and more around getting politicians elected, contemporary parties are
professionalized campaign machines tuned to complex information environments. To
a greater extent than before, party officials fundraise, develop brand images, conduct
market research, advertise, and, if successful, manage the affairs of government.
Parties are therefore seen as “in service” to the elected officials whose careers depend
on receiving party support” [citations omitted]. See also 666: “Those who do not toe
the party line do so to the detriment of their political careers…. Parties discipline
disloyal MPs and isolate them from their colleagues” [citation omitted]. Presumably
caucusing with a non-party legislator would be seen as disloyalty.

47

Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II,
No 5. See e.g. Canada (House of Commons) v Vaid, 2005 SCC 30 at para 29:
“Parliamentary privilege does not create a gap in the general public law of Canada but
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Westminster parliamentary tradition as part of the Constitution. Insofar as
floor-crossing was allowed under that tradition,48 the preamble itself
arguably provides duelling answers. Does it protect a prohibition on floorcrossing because that prohibition is part of parliamentary privilege for the
legislature to determine its own internal governance and processes? This is
the answer given in Fletcher. But it could also be the case that the preamble
prevents a prohibition on floor-crossing, because that prohibition is
contrary to Westminster parliamentary tradition.49 In other words, does
parliamentary privilege allow the legislature to contravene parliamentary
tradition? There is a compelling argument to be made that, insofar as floorcrossing was a recognized part of Parliamentary practice in the United
Kingdom and thus an aspect of the unwritten Canadian constitution, the
prohibition in Fletcher was actually contrary to the preamble instead of
protected by it. This argument remains unraised and unanswered. However,
it does suggest that the government’s concession that the prohibition was
contrary to parliamentary tradition was not as innocuous as it seemed and
was perhaps unwise.

is an important part of it, inherited from the Parliament at Westminster by virtue of
the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867” [citations omitted] [Constitution Act UK].
48

See e.g. Robert Leach, Turncoats: Changing Party Allegiance by British Politicians
(Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995) at 3, who traces UK floor-crossing back as far as 1886.
For a list of floor-crossing from 1900 to 2015 in the UK Parliament, see Roger
Mortimore & Andrew Blick, eds, Butler’s British Political Facts (London: Palgrave
McMillan, 2018) at 388-395. In the Canadian context, see e.g. Gregory Tardi,
“Change of Political Allegiance in Parliamentary Life” (2007) 33:3 Commonwealth L
Bulletin 429 at 430, who traces floor crossing in post-confederation Canada back to
1868.

49

See e.g. Tardi, supra note 48 at 433-434: “A reasonable argument can be made that
once a member has been elected to the House of Commons, their most significant
parliamentary privilege is their ability to speak in favour of, to vote with, and
therefore, to ally themselves with, the political formation of their choice. This
privilege applies throughout the MP’s time in Parliament, and includes their ability to
change the direction of their speech, their vote and their allegiance at any time.
Considering the constitutional nature and character of Parliamentary privilege, this
ability on the part of MPs is thus opposable to any duty or obligation that may be
born out of simple statute or claimed to have arisen from the common law. The
lineage of this line of argumentation is based on Canada’s inheritance of
parliamentary privilege from the United Kingdom” [emphasis added].
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IV. PART III – LESSONS: FROM IDEA TO LEGISLATION
Aside from the merits of the reasons themselves, the decision in Fletcher
and the prohibition itself offer compelling case studies in two respects: the
process of translating an idea into legislation, and the proper role of the
Attorney General in defending legislation that the government intends to
repeal. In this Part, I consider the former.
The prohibition itself and the decision in Fletcher form a compelling
case study in the difficulty of translating an idea into legislation. First, how
do we define floor-crossing? Justice Lanchbery provided a definition that
seems appropriate: “Floor crossing is commonly understood to mean when
a member leaves the benches of the political party to whom he/she was
elected to serve, and seeks to join the ranks of another political party,
without facing the electorate.”50 He also noted that the most objectionable
kind of floor-crossing is “where the member is […] offered an inducement
such as a seat in the Cabinet of the governing party.”51
Next, why is floor-crossing objectionable enough that a prohibition is
appropriate – to those who do consider it objectionable? I acknowledge here
that voter opposition to floor-crossing may be “conventional wisdom” more
than empirical fact.52 However, that is the wisdom that appeared to animate
the comments of Lanchbery J and the Manitoba legislators during both the
adoption and the repeal of the floor-crossing prohibition. Floor-crossing is
objectionable because voters incorporate party affiliation into their voting
choices, running as a party’s candidate implies a commitment to that party
50

Fletcher, supra note 2 at para 5; see above note 41 and accompanying text.

51

Ibid; see above note 41 and accompanying text.

52

Feodor Snagovsky & Matthew Kerby, “The Electoral Consequences of Party Switching
in Canada: 1945-2011” (2018) 51:2 Can J Political Science 425 at 426: “conventional
wisdom portrays [party] switching as an act of political self-immolation: few MPs who
switch parties get re-elected.” See also Sevi, Yoshinaka & Blais, supra note 46 at 666:
“Floor crossing in the contemporary era is the ultimate risky proposition.” Snagovsky
& Kerby provide a thoughtful quantitative analysis of whether MPs who switch parties
receive more or fewer votes in the subsequent election. While “the proportion of MPs
who switch parties and fail in their bids for re-election is considerably higher than it is
for those [who] do not switch at all” (431), the impact and degree of impact varies
depending on the reasons for, and circumstances surrounding, the switch: 441-442.
For a longer-term historical analysis, see Sevi, Yoshinaka & Blais, supra note 46 at 685692.
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(at least for the term of office), and a change in party is a substantial change
on which voters should be able to reconsider their voting choices. Or, as
Heather MacIvor puts it, “the act of campaigning under a particular political
banner creates a principled and political link between the MP so elected,
the party and the constituents, which the law ought not allow to be
breached.”53 Similarly, Cameron Siles describes the act of floor crossing as
invoking, “[t]he sense that voters had somehow been ‘duped’… and deprived
of their right to be fully-informed and participate meaningfully in the
electoral process.”54 Consider also Karen Eltis’ articulation of a prevalent
view that “a vote for one’s member of Parliament is tantamount to a vote
for a particular party, its program and its leader.”55 Thus a prohibition may
be an appropriate legislative response.
However, the Manitoban prohibition might be overinclusive, i.e. there
are some situations that may be captured by this prohibition that might be
different and permissible. As noted by Lanchbery J, Fletcher’s situation was
that he was expelled from his party’s caucus. Is that different enough that
he should be able to join another party? During the debates on the repeal
of the prohibition, one NDP legislator suggested not, saying that “when
folks are kicked out of their caucus, they have to deal with the
53

Heather MacIvor, “Federal Bill C-208 of 2006 and 2007: A Legislative Proposal on
Floor Crossing” (2009) 2 JPPL 329 at 329. See also Lori Turnbull, “Rules are Not
Enough: How Can We Enforce Ethical Principles?” (2008) 1 JPPL 351 at 357: “[floorcrossing] is now interpreted widely as an MP’s betrayal of his constituents’ preferences
and an abuse of their trust.”

54

Siles, supra note 23 at 172.

55

Eltis, supra note 34 at 222. See also Sevi, Yoshinaka & Blais, supra note 46 at 667:
“Canada’s electoral system went from a candidate-centred system to a party-centred
one, where the party leader and the label play a huge role in deciding the fortune of
the individual candidate.” See similarly Globe editorial, supra note 1: “After all, many
if not most MPs are elected because of the banner they carry”. But see for example the
work of Andre Blais and Jean-Francois Daoust, suggesting that approximately 4% of
voters in federal elections vote for a local candidate they prefer even though the
candidate is running for a party other than the party they prefer: Andre Blais & JeanFrancois Daoust, “What Do Voters Do When They Like a Local Candidate From
Another Party?” (2017) 50:4 Can J Political Science 1103 at 1107: “In short, in these
three provinces [BC, Ontario, and Quebec], around one voter out of ten particularly
liked a candidate from a party other than the one he or she preferred in the 2015
Canadian election. For two out of five of such voters, the preference for the local
candidate trumped the party preference.”
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consequences.”56 Fletcher’s intended change in party affiliation was also the
opposite of the usual floor-crossing – he sought to join an opposition party,
not the governing party.
Moreover, what if the member leaves the party in circumstances such as
a change in leadership or a dramatic shift in party policy? During the 2006
debates on the prohibition, one legislator invoked the example of Winston
Churchill and suggested that “his party deserted him.”57 Consider, at the
federal level, the merger of the Canadian Alliance Party and the Progressive
Conservative Party into the Conservative Party.58 One Member of
Parliament, Joe Clark, chose to continue as a member of the Progressive
Conservative Party.59 Another member, Scott Brison, chose to join the
Liberal Party.60 In a sense, they abandoned the official and majority stance
of their party by refusing to join the merged party. However, the Progressive
Conservative party arguably deserted them both by merging with the
Canadian Alliance party. If there had been a prohibition on floor-crossing,
should it have affected these members?
The prohibition might also be underinclusive. For example, if it is
problematic for a member elected under one party to change parties, why is
it not problematic for a member elected as an independent to join a party?
Voters presumably took the candidate’s lack of party affiliation into account
in a similar way as they would consider a candidate’s party affiliation.
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Once the conduct to be prohibited is identified and defined, what is
the appropriate penalty to be imposed or the deterrent to be threatened?
The prohibition Fletcher challenged provided that the member “must sit in
the Assembly as an independent and is to be treated as such for the purposes
of this Act and all proceedings in the Assembly during the remainder of the
member's term.”61 The penalty, if it can be called that,62 is “to be treated as”
an independent. The provision functions by binding the Speaker and the
apparatus of the Assembly.
The provision challenged in Fletcher is similar to a prohibition enacted
in New Brunswick in 2014 (and repealed in 2015), which provided that a
member who:
ceases to belong to the caucus of that registered political party during the term for
which he or she was elected…. shall be treated during the remainder of the
member’s term as an independent member of the Legislative Assembly with
respect to the proceedings in the Legislative Assembly and for all other purposes.63

(The New Brunswick prohibition also explicitly identifies resignation as an
alternative for a member who leaves a caucus).64 However, the act adopting
the New Brunswick prohibition, perhaps concerned about retrospective
application of the law, also amended the Elections Act to state that “[t]he
nomination papers of a candidate of a registered political party shall include
a statement” acknowledging the prohibition.65 Like the Manitoba
prohibition, the New Brunswick prohibition does not consider whether the
member left the caucus voluntarily, and does not prevent a member elected
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as an independent from joining a caucus, or a member of a caucus leaving
that caucus to sit as an independent.
Contrast here Eltis’ narrower and more nuanced prohibition proposal,
in which members who cross the floor would be prohibited from Cabinet
membership until after a by-election or the next general election.66 This
approach targets only the most problematic kinds of floor-crossing and does
so in a more defensible way that is less impairing of members’ Charter
rights.67
The provision challenged in Fletcher and the New Brunswick
prohibition can also be contrasted with bills from other Canadian
jurisdictions that would have banned floor-crossing. Consider, for example,
Bill C-212, which would have amended the Parliament of Canada Act:
Any person holding a seat in the House of Commons who becomes a member of
a registered party as defined in subsection 2(1) of the Canada Elections Act is
deemed to have vacated the seat and ceases to be a member of the House if, in the
last election, the person was endorsed by another registered party or was not
endorsed by a registered party.68

The penalty here is that the member actually loses his or her seat (this
prohibition also applies to a member elected as an independent). To similar
effect is the Ontario Respect for Voters Act, which would have amended the
Legislative Assembly Act:
If a member who is elected to the Assembly while a member of a political party
registered under the Election Finances Act leaves that party or a successor of that
party, as the case may be, the member is disqualified by law to continue to sit or
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vote in the Assembly, his or her seat shall be vacated and a writ shall issue forthwith
for a new election to fill the vacancy.69

Under the Ontario bill, it is the act of leaving a party that triggers the
loss of the seat. Thus, a member who is kicked out of his or her party’s
caucus, or chooses to sit as an independent, suffers the same result as a
member who chooses to leave his or her party’s caucus for another party’s
caucus. In contrast, under Bill C-212, it is the act of joining a party that
triggers the loss of the seat. Thus, a member who is kicked out of his or her
party’s caucus retains her seat so long as she does not join another party.
Similarly, a member can leave a party to become an independent without
losing her seat.70 MacIvor characterizes this as one of the bill’s “peculiar
consequences.”71
The Ontario bill is unique in that it incorporates the idea of a “successor
party” – although it does not attempt to define this phrase. It is unclear how
this concept applies. In the Scott Brison situation – a member refusing to
join a successor party and joining another party instead – the member would
presumably lose his seat. However, the Joe Clark situation is complicated.
By remaining in the predecessor party, Clark did not “leave” the successor
party, he merely did not join it.
These parameters demonstrate that a prohibition on floor-crossing,
which may seem like a straightforward concept, becomes much more
complex in drafting and implementation. Recall here the Minister of
Justice’s characterization of the Manitoba prohibition as “unworkable.”72

V. PART IV – LESSONS: THE ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL IN DEFENDING LEGISLATION
Fletcher and the corresponding repeal of the floor-crossing prohibition
also present a worthwhile case study in when a government should defend,
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or not defend, legislation in court. In particular, they raise the issue of the
proper role of the Attorney General in defending legislation, adopted under
a previous government, that the current government believes is bad policy
and intends to repeal.
Recall Fletcher’s repeated suggestion that if the government was
repealing the prohibition because it was concerned about the cost of
opposing his application, an easy solution would have been to concede the
application.73 Recall the Minister of Justice’s comments in the legislative
debates, and the government’s concession on the application, that the
prohibition was contrary to parliamentary tradition,74 as well as the
Minister’s statement that the prohibition was “unworkable” and “should
never have been introduced in the first place.”75 Finally, recall also Andrew
Swan’s assertion that the government could not concede the application
because it had received advice that the legislation was arguably
constitutional.76
Since it is impossible to know what advice the government received, it
is best to set out two possibilities. In scenario one, the government thinks
the prohibition is bad policy but has received advice that it is arguably
constitutional. In scenario two, the government thinks the prohibition is
bad policy and has received advice that it is not constitutional. Is conceding
the application appropriate in either scenario? Arguably, only in scenario
two.
The literature in this area is divided over whether the Attorney General,
acting on behalf of the government, can properly concede the
unconstitutionality of legislation. Grant Huscroft (now Justice Huscroft of
the Ontario Court of Appeal) has argued that “a decision by an Attorney
General to concede that legislation is unconstitutional is constitutionally
objectionable because it undermines the legislative branch of
government.”77 That is, there is a “constitutional interest inherent in
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defence of the legislative process” and “the defence of legislation is
constitutionally important for its own sake.”78 Indeed, under this view, the
Attorney General has a “constitutional duty to the legislative branch.”79
Moreover, such concessions establish bad precedents and impede the
proper role of the courts to determine constitutionality.80 Under Huscroft’s
view, the Attorney General should essentially never concede the
unconstitutionality of a law. It is for the Attorney General to protect the
lawmaking power of the legislature, and it is for the courts to determine
constitutionality.
In contrast, former Attorney General for Ontario Ian Scott argued that
concessions are appropriate where the Attorney General considers the
legislation to be unconstitutional:
I think it is reasonable to conclude that an attorney general, if he advises the
government that the provincial law is unconstitutional, is free to indicate, with
Cabinet concurrence, that he will amend the legislation in the face of a challenge
or settle the lawsuit on the basis that the law is unconstitutional.81

Scott himself directed government lawyers to concede unconstitutionality
in some circumstances.82 Similarly, Kent Roach argues that “[t]he Attorney
General should not impose burdens on citizens by defending laws that are
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clearly unconstitutional or conducting litigation in a manner that ignores
clear constitutional obligations placed upon the state.”83
A mixed or more nuanced view would be that the government should
defend legislation whenever there is a credible argument for its
constitutionality.84 While a credible argument is difficult to define, Noël J
in Schmidt v Canada (Attorney General) described a credible argument as “[a]n
argument that is credible, bona fide, and capable of being successfully argued
before the courts.”85 Under this view, it is the existence of a credible
argument for constitutionality, not the government’s opinion that the
legislation is constitutional or unconstitutional, that is determinative. It is
this approach to which Andrew Swan referred in the legislative debates on
the repeal of the prohibition.86 This approach protects the lawmaking ability
of the legislature to a reasonable but not absolute extent – the freedom to
pass laws that are at least arguably constitutional.
However, none of these approaches indicate what a government should
do when it believes legislation to be constitutional but bad policy. I would
argue that the decision to defend against a constitutional challenge should
be made regardless of the government’s view as to whether or not the law is
problematic as policy. Under the Huscroft view, unconstitutionality should
never be conceded; under the Scott view, concession is appropriate where
the government believes the legislation is unconstitutional; under the mixed
view, concession is inappropriate so long as there is a credible argument as
to constitutionality. However, under no view is it appropriate to concede
unconstitutionality merely because the government believes the legislation
is bad policy, even if it plans to repeal the law for that reason. The
government is free to concede in court that the law is bad policy, as the
government of Manitoba did in Fletcher by conceding that the prohibition
83

Kent Roach, “Not Just the Government’s Lawyer: The Attorney General as Defender
of the Rule of Law” (2006) 31:2 Queen’s LJ 598 at 610.

84

See Huscroft, “Advocate or Adjudicator”, supra note 77 at 161, n 94, citing Patrick J
Monahan & Marie Finkelstein, “The Charter of Rights and Public Policy in Canada”
(1992) 30 Osgoode Hall LJ 501 at 526: “The Saskatchewan Attorney General … will
defend legislation if it is arguably constitutional.”

85

Schmidt v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FC 269 at para 5, aff’d 2018 FCA 55. There
are problems with the “credible argument” standard, but they are beyond the scope of
this comment.

86

See text accompanying note 19 above.

Unconstitutional or Just Unworkable? 71
was contrary to parliamentary traditions, and indicate its plan to repeal the
law, as the government also did in Fletcher.87 But neither this concession nor
this indication have legal consequences.88
The lesson, or reminder, from Fletcher is that, while the government
should perhaps be willing to concede the unconstitutionality of legislation
that it has been advised is unconstitutional, it should never concede
unconstitutionality merely to expedite the nullification of a law that it
considers to be bad policy. That is, the correct approach to legislation that
is merely bad policy is to amend or repeal it.

VI. CONCLUSION
In this comment, I have provided an overview of Fletcher and explained
its important lessons for lawmaking and the legal defence of government
legislation. In Part I, I provided the context of the passage and repeal of the
prohibition on floor-crossing challenged in Fletcher. In Part II, I set out the
arguments made and reasons given in Fletcher, and provided a brief critique
of those reasons. Then in Part III I demonstrated that Fletcher provides a
case study in the translation of ideas into legislation, a process that can be
more difficult than it appears. In particular, defining the conduct that is to
be prohibited can often result in underinclusive or overinclusive laws, and
determining the appropriate sanction can be difficult. Finally, in Part IV, I
considered the lessons from Fletcher in whether the Attorney General
should concede the unconstitutionality of a law that the government
considers bad policy and plans to repeal. I argued that while the government
should perhaps be willing to concede the unconstitutionality of legislation
that it has been advised is unconstitutional, it should never concede
unconstitutionality merely to expedite the nullification of a law that it
considers to be bad policy.
Fletcher ultimately demonstrates that governments should defend
constitutionally viable laws in court – even laws that were adopted by a
previous government and that are destined for repeal as bad policy. This
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defence is not a waste of public funds, even if it may appear so at some level.
Furthermore, it is not for the courts to strike down laws that are bad policy
but constitutional. The sole appropriate response to such bad laws is
amendment or repeal by the legislature.

